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Controlling the Philosophical Imaginary: Reading
Pierre Hadot with Luiz Costa Lima
Matthew Sharpe
Abstract This essay proffers a critical complement to Luiz Costa Lima’s claims
concerning the nature, history, and control of the imagination in Western culture.
Accepting the wide scope of Costa Lima’s critical claim about the socio-political
control of imaginative literature in Western history, we claim that Pierre
Hadot’s work on philosophy as a bios in the ancient West cautions us lest we pos-
ition philosophy in this history as always and necessarily an agency of control. At
different times, philosophy has rather stood as an ally in practicing and promoting
forms of criticity, and the playful, creative, and transformative envisaging of
alternative ways of experiencing the world Costa Lima theoretically celebrates
in literary fiction. Any critique of philosophy as always opposed to the critical
imagination can only stand, we have argued, relative to philosophy as conceived
on what Hadot suggests is but one, albeit the now hegemonic model: namely, as a
body of systematic rational discourses, including discourses about the literary,
poetics, and imaginary. What this vision of philosophy misses, Hadot shows, is
how the ancient conception of philosophy (which survives in figures like Mon-
taigne, Nietzsche, and Goethe) as a way of life promoted distinctly literary, aes-
thetic, and imaginative practices; first, to assist in the existential
internalisation of the schools’ ideas; secondly, to envisage in the sage and
utopias edifying counterfactuals to help students critically reimagine accepted
norms; and thirdly, in the conception of a transformed way of living and perceiv-
ing ‘according to nature’, whose parameters of autonomy and pleasurable contem-
plation of the singularity of the present experiences anticipate the experiences
delineated in modern aesthetic theory.
Whereas Plato contained everything, nonsense, reason and myths, our
philosophers contain nothing except either nonsense or reason, because
they have closed their eyes to the rest. The mole is meditating. (Camus
1968: 151)
Imitation bien lointaine que cette mime´sis humaine! (Hadot 2010f: 289)
Brazilian literary theorist Luiz Costa Lima’s central claim concerning a ‘control
of the imaginary’ in Western reflections upon art and literature responds to a
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problem that emerged from his early studies of literary theory in the Italian
Renaissance, and he tells us has transfixed him ever since (Costa Lima 1989:
3). ‘If we accept the label “modernity” for the period beginning after the
middle ages’, The Dark Side of Reason reflects: ‘my question is the following:
in this period, haven’t the products deriving specifically from the activation
of the imagination been subject to a particularised control’ (Costa Lima
1992: 13)? Costa Lima’s claim is not that such ‘control’ has always been con-
scious, or exercised by specific empowered groups, to be enforced by the
police – although at times this ‘ban’ has taken an openly repressive form.1
What Costa Lima means by ‘control’, by contrast with such censorship, is an
epistemological, moral, theological, and cultural phenomenon. As other
essays in this issue explore, it is a control often so widely internalised by
authors and the literary public that it is not conscious, or in need of explicit
legislation or policing.2 At times, Costa Lima is content to evoke Foucault’s
notion of modern, capillary or micro-power to describe the kind of phenomena
his work aims to uncover, and to contest. Readers can be reminded also of
Gramsci’s notion of hegemony, and some post-Althusserian accounts of ideol-
ogy. The targets of Costa Lima’s control, however, are less subjects’ souls or
bodies, as per Foucault, as the products of their imaginative, mimetic and crea-
tive capabilities: viz. dramas and plays, poems, and in the modern period,
novels. The ‘control of the imagination’ is the name Costa Lima gives firstly
to the way literary theory, beginning at least with the Romans, has systemati-
cally failed to recognise, or tried to domesticate, the creative and potentially criti-
cal capacity works of art sustain. This capacity, which Costa Lima associates
with Aristotle’s notion of mime¯sis, gives body to imaginative, alternative
worlds, characters, and possibilities. The ‘as if’ worlds and plots are similar
enough to the world we know, its personages, joys and sorrows, that they
hold up a mirror to it. Yet, here’s the rub, they are also sufficiently different
from the worlds we know and move within that the reflection cast by these fic-
tional mirrors reveals our lifeworlds in new, sometimes transformative critical
lights. And it is this critical potential, Costa Lima suggests, that has attracted
the phenomena of control, and sometimes open political censorship.
We cannot here reconstruct Costa Lima’s intriguing critical and construc-
tive theses concerning literature. Our response to these theses, which is quite
1‘What is termed the control of the imagination should not be confounded with
censorship either of literary works or tendencies. Censorship is rather a punctual pro-
hibition, sanctioned by norms, and condemns the circulation of works with a given
combination of characteristics. In contrast, control involves a more delicate decision:
something is perceived as unacceptable, improper, or base, but its production is not
simply prohibited . . . Thus, it would make no sense to speak of the control of avant-
garde art under Nazism or Stalinism or to say that Baudelaire and Flaubert were con-
trolled. No, Baudelaire, Flaubert, and the avant-garde were censored’ (Costa Lima
2008a: 150).
2As Costa Lima specifies, the control he means is: ‘associated with values on a phi-
losophical-religious spectrum and, consequently, how the variables inherent in the
process of controlling domestication comprised elements that were aesthetic, political
(the nation), pragmatic (utility), philosophico-religious, and concerned with public
interest’ (Costa Lima 2008a: 153).
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specific, begins from the observation of the liminal or ambiguous status
Western philosophy has in his system. On the one hand, Aristotle’s Poetics
marks for Costa Lima the inception of a path not taken by subsequent literary
theory: one whose central category of mimesis promises to unlock the key to an
understanding of literature, between formalistic analyses and those which
would reduce it to a species of mendacity or flawed imitatio of the truths of
history. In ‘The Hybrid Form of Literature’, philosophy is named as a
second ‘seminal disposition’ of human beings, reflectively questioning the
meaning of existence. Therein, it is favourably contrasted with religion –
whose ‘communal vocation’ Costa Lima thinks positions it opposite art’s cri-
ticity or ‘self-questioning’ – and seemingly aligns philosophy’s forms of criti-
cal self-reflection with the fictional (2008b: 169–170).3 On the other hand, the
dominant trend in Costa Lima’s translated texts is to position philosophy
negatively. Aligned with religion, philosophy is placed on the side of social
control, and the forgetting or occlusion of the imaginary. In ‘The Insufficiency
of the Legacy of Antiquity’, philosophy, which works with concepts and argu-
ments, is opposed to the entire field of mimesis (2008f: 162). Already Aristotle’s
De Anima, Costa Lima notes, introduces ‘imagination’ ( fantasia) as a means to
explain cognitive error; and the Poetics, itself soon marginalised in the Helle-
nistic schools, says nothing of ‘fiction’ (plasma) (2008c: 160). In The Control of
the Imaginary, Costa Lima frequently skirts around depicting philosophy as a
means of control, particularly under the header of the edifying ‘classicism’
of the Renaissance critics with its exalted models of ethical conduct, tied to
the philosophic tradition and its ‘atemporal, restrictive version of reason’ or
‘arrogant rationalism’ (1989: 31, 33). As he writes: ‘and ethics pressed in on
the poets, limited their use of imagination, forced them to approach the
natural not through verism but rather, so that nature might be made
sublime, through a rhetorical imitation of the ancients’ (1989: 25; see also
30–34).
Our concern here then is with the place of Western philosophy in Costa
Lima’s remarkable account of Western literary culture, and the control of the
critical and fictive imagination. Is philosophy from Plato’s Politeia onwards,
with its driving concerns for truth and – in its classical forms – promotion
of normative models of conduct and virtue, not a principal agent in the
control of the imaginary, in an ‘ancient quarrel’ that continues in the age of
science and modern philosophical systems?
We want to bring to these questions the particular perspective on the
nature and history of philosophy of the French thinker, Pierre Hadot.
Hadot’s signature claim is that in the Hellenic, Hellenistic and imperial
periods, philosophy was conceived and practiced as a way of life (manie`re de
vivre), involving a set of existential practices (askeses) aiming to form students
so they might speak but also act in accordance with the different schools’ con-
ceptions of nature and/or the good life. Of course, the ancient schools (Stoic,
3At another point, Costa Lima closely identifies the emergence of the theory, and
practice of critical, mimesis with the birth of tragic poetry: in the particular, democratic
or republican context of 5th–4th century Greece, which is also the birthplace of
philosophy.
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Epicurean, Platonic, peripatetic) formulated systematic philosophical dis-
courses laying claim to rational accounts of the natural world, and our place
within the kosmos. Yet, Hadot argues, the construction of systematic discourses
was never for these schools an end in itself. It remained in the pedagogic
service of justifying, orienting, shaping, and attracting students’ existential
commitments: as Socrates’, Diogenes’, Epictetus’ and many other ancient phi-
losophers’ failure to write at all already suggests. And this points to the heart
of our particular concern: Hadot’s claim concerning why this conception of
philosophia has subsequently disappeared from the Western cultural horizon,
to the point it is now nearly entirely absent in contemporary university phil-
osophy, remarkably mirrors Costa Lima’s history of the control of the literary
imagination. Like Costa Lima at times, Hadot assigns the principal cause of
this effective ‘control’ of philosophy as a manie`re de vivre to the ascension of
Christianity in the later imperial period. Eventually, in 529 CE, the Christian
Emperor Justinian closed the philosophical schools. After this event, so
Hadot argues, the philosophical askeses were integrated into the Christian
monastic traditions. Meanwhile, the philosophical discourses developed in
the schools to support these practices were cut loose from their existential
moorings (Hadot 1995: 129–135). Those parts of these deracinated philosophi-
cal discourses held to be consistent with revealed dogmata (particularly of the
neo-Platonic and Aristotelian systems) were taken up in Christian theology
(2002: 218–219, 239–240). But the cultivation of ways of life has from the
end of the antique period in the West been assigned to religion (with Christian-
ity early on even claiming its status as the true ‘philosophy’ in the ancient
sense). ‘Philosophy’ survives into our own times as a set of discourses with,
in general, little claim to existential force: a matter of informing, rather than
forming, students, and of teaching technical, philological, logical, exegetical
and historical competencies.
The convergence of Hadot’s account of the fate of ancient philosophia with
Costa Lima’s claims concerning a control of the literary imagination in the
West prompts the following questions and our subject here: what if Costa
Lima’s marginalisation of philosophy, or aligning of her with the forces of con-
trolling the imaginary, can be seen to respond only to a modern or post-classical
conception of philosophy shorn of its existential claims, largely by the same
theology which for a long period controlled literature? What if, more than
this, Costa Lima’s account of the control of the imagination misses how
ancient philosophy’s lost or ‘banned’ existential dimension involved an
active deployment of the literary and imaginative of exactly the kind Costa Lima is
concerned to recover?
In what follows, we will highlight via Hadot’s work at least three uses of
the imaginary in classical philosophy which have since largely disappeared
from philosophical discourse. First, there is the role of the imagination in
what Hadot calls philosophy’s ‘spiritual exercises’ (for instance, ‘the view
from above’ and written hypomne¯mata [memory aids]). Secondly, there is the
remarkable ‘counterfactual’ philosophical literature depicting the sage and
utopias like Plato’s Politeia, created with the precise aim of opening up an ima-
ginary ‘no/good-place’ with reference to which existing ways of living can be
criticised. Finally, we consider Hadot’s remarkable account of the para-aes-
thetic perspective or conscience cosmique of the sage. Our claim will be that,
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while the limits to a rapprochement of Hadot’s work with that of Costa Lima
must be respected (see our concluding remarks), the second and third philoso-
phical uses of the imaginary in particular associate ancient philosophia much
more closely with literature – and its capacity for the criticidade (criticity)
that Costa Lima aims to reanimate – than we might otherwise suppose.
Perhaps the best way to approach our contribution here is by way of a lit-
erary example. In Dark Side of Reason, Costa Lima’s fascinating treatment of
Cervantes’ remarkable, playful framing of Don Quixote, is a brilliant illus-
tration of the power of his interpretive frame. Costa Lima highlights how Cer-
vantes was very far from presenting his work as a would-be ‘history’ or quasi-
documentary imitatio on the model of his predecessors, de Boron or de Troyes.
Chre´tien de Troyes, Costa Lima notes, had felt the need to win the fair hearing
of readers in Yvain, ou le Chevalier au Lion by reassuring them of the near-his-
torical verisimilitude of his chronicling: ‘Thus, he who wishes to understand
me should entrust me with his heart and his ears, for I do not wish to tell
either dream, or fable, or falsehood’ (2008a: 151). In Merlin, de Boron had
his strangely Christian magician Merlin instruct Blaise, the narrator of the
tale, about the hierarchy of literary forms according to their proximity to
truth, first person testimony, and the incarnation of Truth itself: a hierarchy
in which Blaise’s own literary labour sits very low:
. . . [your work] will not be [taken as] an authority, since you are not,
nor can you be [counted] among the apostles . . . Neither did the apos-
tles ever put in writing anything from our Lord other than that which
they had seen and heard, while you have put in nothing that you have
seen or heard, other than that which I have told you. (151)
Costa Lima stresses that Cervantes’ Don Quixote by contrast clearly sets out to
reflectively play with the kind of controlling expectations that throughout this
period were turning poets like de Baron and de Troyes into their own, dec-
orous censors. As Costa Lima recounts, the tale is first ascribed by Cervantes
to some chroniclers of La Mancha. But their chronicles were only part com-
plete. So we are then told that the narrator had to purchase a mysterious
manuscript in Arabic, and have it translated by one ‘Cid Hamet Benengali’,
an Arab historian (Costa Lima 1992: 9). If there are any doubts as to the narra-
tive’s veracity, we are then taunted, these can be blamed on Benengali, ‘since
lying is a very common propensity with those of that nation’ (Cervantes,
quoted in Costa Lima 1992: 9).4 Then there are the edifying discourses Cer-
vantes puts in the mouths of the canon and the curate about literature
within Don Quixote, in which Costa Lima finds Cervantes presenting
4Costa Lima also notably observes that the tale (which is itself about a man who
can’t tell fiction from historical fact [1992: 5–7]) includes frequent digressions,
showing (as he approvingly cites Nick Spadaccini) that the book ‘was intended for
private consumption so that demystifying and subversive material could be included’
(Costa Lima 1992: 10). The frequent digressions in many ancient philosophical texts
can be, and have been, argued by critics to have served a similar literary and political
purpose (Strauss 1978).
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pointed parodies of the discourses of verisimilitude, imitation, and decorum
against which his novel had to find its voice and freedom, yet which de
Troyes and de Baron had internalised. The good Sen˜or could do no better
than reading the Book of Judges in the Holy Book, the Canon tells the
knight-errant. Other books may be permitted which have produced large
progeny, or were written by men of eminence. Such edifying works are to
be opposed, particularly, to works which ‘shun verisimilitude and truth of
nature [imitacido]’, being instead ‘harsh in their style, incredible in their
achievements, licentious in their amours’, very like one Don Quixote by Cer-
vantes (Costa Lima 1992: 7–8).
Thinking with Costa Lima of Cervantes’ playful distancing of his author-
ial voice, via his narrator who in turn passes responsibility finally to Hamet
Benengali, our opening question is simply this: amidst almost the entirety of
Western literature, might not this remind us most of all of the comical
theatre at the start of Plato’s Symposium? To recall, there we begin with one
Apollodorus answering a query by an interlocutor who is never named (Sym-
posium: 172a). In his response, Apollodorus recounts running into Glaucon,
who then (in this already recollected scene) asked Apollodorus to recount a
story about a drinking party some years before (in a scene, then, at two
removes and many years from the direct narration) (Symposium: 172a–b).
This was a party, moreover, at which Apollodorus was not present (Sym-
posium: 172b–c). So he only gets the tale from a third man, named Aristode-
mus, leaving us at three removes from the original reality (see Republic:
599a: tritta apechonta tou ontos). But this Aristodemus, Plato tells us was – in
Nehamas’ translation – very like Cervantes’ Benengali, ‘a real runt of a man
(smikros)’ (Symposium: 173b). Apollodorus himself, we next learn from his
nameless interlocutor, has the reputation of being a crazy enthusiast (to
malakos) of philosophy: this after Apollodorus has meanwhile emptied
himself of some unprovoked, impolitic invective against all people who
don’t understand the greatness of philosophy (Symposium: 173c).5
The very fact that Plato chose to write in dialogues also meant that, like
Cervantes with his curate and canon, his texts frequently include parodies
of the representatives of opposing positions (consider Callicles or Thrasyma-
chus, but also Hippias) – to say nothing of the frequent digressions that, as
Costa Lima notes, also mark off Don Quixote as being ‘intended for private con-
sumption so that demystifying and subversive material could be included’
(1992: 10). Put differently, recalling the example of the Symposium alongside
5Other Platonic examples might be cited, including the opening of the Protagoras.
But consider here the play at the opening of Plato’s Theaetetus, which opens with the
character Euclides being asked by a character Terpsion to recount the conversation
of Socrates with the young Theaetetus many years ago (a first distancing), which
one ‘Euclides’ had written down, since Terpsion has a bad memory (a second distan-
cing). When we note that ‘Euclides’ in fact is known to have written now-lost Socratic
dialogues, and hence to have been a rival of Plato – as well as evoking the name of the
great ancient mathematician in a dialogue principally featuring the mathematician
Theaetetus – it seems very difficult to resist the claim that something very like Cer-
vantes’ literary distancing of himself from the truth or verisimilitude of his tale in
Don Quixote is operative already in this philosophical dialogue.
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Don Quixote makes it difficult to avoid concluding that the West’s founding
philosopher, Plato, was, in Costa Lima’s terms in Dark Side of Reason, a
master of the arts of creative literary mimesis. Or else, we might say that
Plato was already a proto-modern fictional author, if as Costa Lima suggests:
‘modern fictionality is based in irony, on distancing, on the creation of a com-
plexity that, without alienating the common reader, does not present itself to
him as a form of illusionism’ (7).
It is just this possibility, or the possibility that not only Plato but the differ-
ent representatives of classical philosophy concertedly cultivated a ‘philoso-
phical imaginary’ with the critical and creative features Costa Lima ascribes
to literary fiction that we want to pursue here. For, in contrast to John
M. Cooper, who has also recently written on ancient philosophy as cultivating
different bioi (20116), the distinctly literary quality of ancient philosophical dis-
course lies at the heart of Hadot’s remarkable reconception of ancient philoso-
phia. Hadot did not begin his scholarly career interested in philosophy as a
way of life. In interview, Hadot indeed underscores how, long before the
topic became famous, he was drawn to its consideration as a philologist, inter-
ested in the ‘literary problem’ facing interpreters of ancient philosophical texts
like Plato’s Symposium (Hadot 2009: 59, see also 30–32). The problem, as Hadot
and many others have noted, is that the ancients do not write good philosophy
as we deem it, in either the analytic or continental schools. In fact, ‘I believe
that systematic treatises, written with the intention of proposing a system,
belong to the 17th and 18th centuries’ (55). Essays and what we recognise as
treatises are present in the ancient era, but they are rare – so both, for
example, are present in Seneca, yet these ‘dialogues’, as they are called, are
always still addressed to single addressees. Even Aristotle’s ‘treatises’ are cir-
cumlocutory transcriptions of lecture notes. Plato writes the highly literary
dialogues we have met, and Cicero modelled his oeuvre and many of its
titles on Plato. Socrates, Epictetus, Diogenes and others wrote nothing; Xeno-
phon and Arian wrote stylised ‘memorabilia’ or diatribai about their heroes.
Lucretius, the greatest Epicurean author we have extant, wrote one of the
greatest poems in Latinate literature. Marcus Aurelius wrote untitled ‘notes
6The contrast between Cooper’s and Hadot’s work on philosophy as a bios is
remarkable. Cooper spends nearly no time on the literary forms of ancient philosophi-
cal texts. Cooper argues that Hadot’s conception of ‘spiritual exercises’ is drawn from
Ignatius Loyola, and that the earliest textual evidence of such practices comes in
Seneca’s De Ira, circa 50 CE: with the exception of Epicurus (Cooper 2011: 21; see
note 4: 402). These practices, he claims (but see his qualifications in lengthy notes 4
and 5: 402), are ‘nonrational’, and a departure from ‘philosophy as grounded in an
individual’s personal grasp, through fully articulated reasoning and argument, of
the true reason why a certain way of life is best’ (Cooper 2011: 21). He argues that
the integration of such exercises into philosophy marked a departure from its Hellenic
and Hellenistic origins, shaped by the ‘spiritual tension . . . [or] anxiety’ of late anti-
quity, which paved the way for the withdrawal into self, ascendant mystery cults,
neo-Platonic mysticism, and Christianity. We cannot deal with these criticisms here
(Cooper 2011: 21–22). We only suggest that Cooper’s criticisms of the spiritual exer-
cises would need to be considered alongside his abstraction from their literary
framing, from which Hadot begins towards his conception of philosophical bios.
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to himself’ (Ta Eis Heauton); and Seneca was perhaps most renowned for his
tragedies, which had a huge influence in the Elizabethan and French Renais-
sances (Hadot 2009: 52–60; Cunliffe 1907).
Hadot’s hypothesis is that this diffuse, literary philosophic culture reflects
the divergent, and much wider, purposes of ancient philosophy than what we
teach and study today. ‘The ancients had a much greater sense than we do of
these differences in language games’, Hadot claims in one of his essays on the
later Wittgenstein (1962: 340). And this sense, Hadot contends, was rooted in
the practical, oral, pedagogical, and institutional context in which the ancients
wrote philosophy. Ancient philosophy was above all conceived pedagogically,
Hadot emphasises, according to a ‘souci pe´dagogique’ directed at addressing
and shaping the psychai of particular students and modelled always on the
paradigm of spoken dialogue (Hadot 2010a: 224; 2009: 52–56). In ways that
can recall the emphasis of the reader-reception theory of literature upon
which Costa Lima draws, Hadot emphasises how the ancients’ philosophical
writings must be read as ‘always intended to produce an effect, a habitus
within the soul, or to provoke a transformation of the self’ of its addressee
(2002: 176). Writing here, like teaching or the often highly-stylised discussions
in the school settings, is conceived not as an end in itself. It is instead ‘a privi-
leged means by which the philosopher can act upon himself and others: for if it
is the expression of the existential option of the person who utters it, discourse
always has, directly or indirectly, a function which is formative, educative,
psychagogic, and therapeutic’ (176).7
It is above all in this wider, existential framing of philosophia that Hadot is
able to espy and draw out at least three roles for the literary imagination in
ancient philosophy. The first of these is directly related to the conception of
philosophy as an ongoing attempt to shape an individual’s life according to
a unifying philosophical vision of the good life. It responds to the recognition
that human beings are not, and can never be, pure minds. Even the most
learned scholar is an embodied, finite creature with passions and investments
in his worldly surrounds, subject to chance and reversals of fortune, and to the
amnesic power of everyday life and habitude. For this reason, Hadot insists
upon the need to describe many of the schools’ philosophical practices –
from dialogue to the memorisation of arguments and principles – as ‘spiritual’
exercises, translating the Greek terms askesis and gymnasis. The reason was that
these askeses aimed to engage and transform the passions of individuals,
shaking the philosophical aspirants (those making progress, the prokoponta)
out of the somnolence of habit. In order to do this, philosophical writing
7The force of this reconception of ancient philosophical writing can be seen most
clearly in works like Boethius’ Consolations of Philosophy; wherein Lady Philosophy
appears to Boethius to reconcile him to his prison-bound state; or Seneca’s Consolations
addressed to his particular persons, including his own mother, to minister to specific
losses. However, notably, Hadot sees the highly stylised forms of Socratic elenchus in
the Platonic dialogues as just what the Statesman at one point states that they are:
often as much concerned with inculcating procedures for thinking in students (‘so
. . . we may become better dialecticians on all topics’ [Statesman: 285c–d]) as with deli-
vering a specific conclusion, for instance concerning the particular nature of the poli-
tikos in that dialogue (Hadot 2002: 73–74).
232 Matthew Sharpe
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [D
ea
kin
 U
niv
ers
ity
 L
ibr
ary
] a
t 1
9:3
9 1
4 J
uly
 20
13
 
needed to be able to call upon the powers of the creative imagination to rapidly
reawaken the mind to the schools’ vision of the world. ‘The word “thought”
does not indicate clearly enough that imagination and sensibility play a
very important role in these exercises’ (2009: 82), Hadot reflects:
What’s interesting about the idea of spiritual exercises is precisely
that it is not a matter of a purely rational consideration, but the
putting in action of all kinds of means, intended to act upon one’s
self. Imagination and affectivity play a capital role here: we must rep-
resent to ourselves in vivid colors the dangers of such-and-such a
passion, and use striking formulations of ideas in order to exhort our-
selves. We must also create habits, and fortify ourselves by preparing
ourselves against hardships in advance. (1995: 284)8
Probably the clearest example here is Hadot’s remarkable reading of
Marcus Aurelius’ Meditations in The Inner Citadel and elsewhere as a collection
of hypomne¯mata (written memory aids to himself). The apparent desultory col-
lection of fragments, aphorisms, dialogues, injunctions, and metaphors – ‘the
repetitions, the multiple variations developed around the same theme and the
stylistic effort . . . which always seeks for a striking, effective formula’ (Hadot
1998: 312) – do not bespeak the philosopher-emperor’s laziness or inattention.
They involve ‘the efforts of a man . . . trying to do what, in the last analysis, we
are all trying to do: to live in complete consciousness and lucidity, to give to
each of our instants its full intensity, and to give meaning to our entire life’
(312–313). As Hadot comments elsewhere in relation to the profusion of rhe-
torical tropes in Marcus’ often limpidly beautiful hypomne¯mata: ‘All images are
suitable for him if they strike the imagination and make the reader conscious
of the illusions and conventions of mankind’ (Hadot 1995: 60).
Of course, a sceptical reading sensitised by Costa Lima’s work on the
control of the imagination might see this use of the philosophical imagination
– which is absolutely central in Hadot (see 1995: 31, 59–60, 85, 88–89, 133,
183–184, 242–244, 277) – as a paradigmatic example of the Roman triumph
of rhetoric over poetics. Here, we might protest, the imagination is only
being enlisted in the business of gilding a preformed philosophical discourse.
Hadot’s rejoinder might be that here what is not preformed, the object to be
transformed in the exercise, is less the literary discourse than the author or
reader themselves. In the spiritual exercise of the ‘view from above’, for
instance – in which the individual is invited to imagine his own life and
experience from an alien, higher perspective, so its pressing concerns
appear tiny in space and time – we witness exactly the kind of alienating or
transformative potentiality of mimesis Costa Lima sees writ large in works of
fiction (2010e: 157–162; 1995: 238–250). Significantly, in ‘Physique et Poe´sie
8Hadot’s wife, Ilsetraut Hadot, has captured this sense well in a work on literary
consolations in ancient philosophy: ‘These exercises are certainly exercises of medita-
tion, but they do not only concern reason; in order to be efficacious, they must link the
imagination and affectivity to the work of reason, and therefore all the psychagogical
means of rhetoric’ (Hadot 2009: 23).
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dans Le Time´e de Platon’, Hadot argues that the Timaeus’ cosmological story in
this great dialogue is precisely such an act of mimesis, very distant (bien loin-
taine) from imitation (2010f: 289), and proffered by Plato with the intention
of ‘engendering grandeur of soul in us, making us live in a cosmic perspective’
(295). The Timaeus thus stands as the kind of ‘pious amusement’ the Phaedrus
suggests writing can be, at its best (290–91):
It remains that, in this physics, it is a matter less of attaining a scien-
tific result than of practising a certain exercise of the imagination, to
produce a certain impression in the soul. (295–296)
The criticism we might raise in light of Costa Lima’s suggestion that, even in a
dialogue like the Timaeus with its spinning of edifying likely tales, the imagin-
ary remained subordinated in ancient philosophy to a prior dogmatic purpose,
is not made so easily when it comes to the second exemplification of the phi-
losophical imaginary in ancient philosophy. It is to this second modality of the
ancient philosophical imagination that we now turn: the ancient schools’
manifold literary discourses concerning the ideal figure of the Sophos or
sage, and the ideal state in the ancient, philosophical utopias.
At issue here is how, in Costa Lima’s positioning of reason and Renais-
sance classicism in his work on early modernity, these cultural forces are
mostly positioned as means of controlling the literary imagination. Faced
with the explosive critical potential of the literary imagination, Costa Lima
suggests, such classicism – which of course drew heavily upon rediscovered
ancient philosophical sources – responded by subordinating the imagination’s
products to the presently accepted, if perhaps threatened, socio-political
norms. By contrast, Hadot stresses how each of the ancient philosophical
schools distinguished sharply between physis (nature, including human
nature) and nomos (human convention and laws). And they associated philo-
sophy’s cultivation of reason as a transcendence out of nomos towards a life
lived ‘according to nature’, in the formulation of the Stoa (2010d: 145–164).
The Platonic cave allegory paradigmatically pictured philosophy as an
ascent out of a cave Socrates agrees is like a contemporary polis, in which
people marvel at shadows cast in unnatural cinematic light on the wall of
the cave. Having turned around their souls, the philosopher aids those who
will listen up a rough ascent towards the true world and light of the sun,
and the truths of Nature and the Ideas. Hadot’s work analyses two literary
topoi common across the ancient schools, both of which seek to give imagina-
tive shape to just this conception of philosophy as leading its students away
from accepting the conventional ideas, values, and opinions of their times.
The first is the fascination in the ancient schools with imagining the figure
of the sage who, in many schools and texts, is depicted as a kind of overman,
beyond the goods and evils imagined by the societies of the day. As Hadot
cites the historian Michelet, in the philosophic schools, ‘Greek religion culmi-
nated in its true God, the sage’ (Hadot 2010b: 238). Hadot explains: ‘We know
that, in all the schools, one would discourse on the conduct of the sage in the
grand circumstances of human life’, before going on to ask: ‘Must he engage in
politics? Should he marry? Can he be placed in distress’ (238)? Plato’s Sym-
posium, which we mentioned above, is in one register a poetic depiction of
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the sage, Socrates, identifying him with the daimon or god Eros, as Hadot
powerfully contends (2010b: 235–237; 1995: 147–178). Hadot emphasises
that there were entire genres of semi-biographical, and often openly fictional,
accounts of such sophoi: Philo’s work on the liberty of the sage; Diogenes’ Lives
of the Philosophers; the legends surrounding Epicurus’ near-divine status in the
Epicurean gardens (2002: 121–122, 226–228); Xenophon’s Memorabilia of
Socrates; or Arian’s Discourses of Epictetus, a literary work modelled on Xeno-
phon, depicting Epictetus’ often extremely fractious speeches and actions in
responses to students, visitors, and dignitaries in his resident Nikopolis.
‘This ideal figure of the sage the Stoic philosophy recognises can never be
realised’, Hadot observes; it was in this sense a purely imaginary thing. Yet
this imaginative figure served a very specific critical and pedagogic function
in shaping ancient philosophia: ‘it exercised for [the student] an attraction, pro-
voking in them enthusiasm and love, making them see the appeal of a better
life and become aware of the perfection which [philosophy] exhorts them to
attain’ (2010b: 245).
Related to the ancient discourses on the philosophic sage is a different but
comparable species of literary imagination in the ancient philosophers. This is
the practice of imagining ideal cities or ‘utopias’ (‘good-’ or ‘no-places’), begin-
ning most famously with the Platonic Republic. The ‘city in speech’ to which
books IV–VII of this work is given over is already a politeia so fabulously unli-
kely by conventional lights that it has been read by many commentators as a
satire on the inescapable distance between philosophy and politics (Strauss
1978). The equality of men and women and common property and child-
rearing were not practiced in any Greek polis, however much Plato’s model
draws on Lycurgan Sparta. In ‘The Figure of the Sage’, Hadot considers the
Stoic philosopher Zeno’s Politeia, whose description of a utopia, Hadot tells
us, caused ‘something of a scandal, since it describes a community of sages’
(Schofield 1991). Far from mirroring the nomoi of the Greek cities of the day,
in fact, Zeno’s utopia depicts a city without external boundaries, laws, law
courts, and temples: ‘for the gods have no need of them and it is a nonsense
to take for sacred the works of the hands of men’ (Hadot 2010b: 245). So scan-
dalous were these suggestions that later Stoa tried to pass them off as the result
of Zeno’s youthful dalliance with the Cynics. As Hadot comments:
One glimpses here that the attitude of the sage with regard to the
social conventions is tied to a certain refusal of civilization, to the
idea of a state of nature, superior to all political, social, organisation,
where it is nevertheless possible to live because all the citizens are
sages. Civilization and culture only have use for men who are no
longer sages. (245)9
9The Epicurean school was, short of the Cynics, arguably the most extreme in its
critique of existing Greek civilisation and values. Lucretius’ De Rerum Natura recurs to
idyllic visions of precivilised men ‘in their own company, . . . [lying] beside a river on
soft grass, 30 under the branches of a towering tree, and, with no great effort, enjoying
themselves, restoring [sic.] their bodies, especially when the weather smiles and
annual seasons scatter flowers across the greening turf ’ (Lucretius 2010: II.29,
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In the remarkable concluding reflections on the significance of the ancient
philosophical texts on the sage in ‘La Figure du Sage dans L’Antiquite´ Gre´co-
Latine’, Hadot makes a point that is laced throughout his texts. He stresses
exactly this critical, even anti-nomian function of this philosophical literature,
relative to the ‘reassuring, familiar world of the quotidian’:
Above all, it seems to me that this figure of the sage is in some way
ineluctable. It is the necessary expression of the tension, the polarity,
of the duality . . . inherent in the human condition. On the one hand,
. . . man has need, in order to support his condition, of being inserted
in the tissue of social and political organisation . . . But this sphere of
the quotidian does not entirely shelter him: it is confronted inevitably
by what we can call the inexpressible, by the terrifying enigma of
man’s being-there, here and now, given over to death, in the immen-
sity of the cosmos: to take conscience of the self and of the existence of
the world is a revelation which ruptures the security of the habitual
and the quotidian . . . The figure of the sage responds thus to an indis-
pensable need . . . The sage will . . . be the man capable of living on the
two plains, perfectly adapted to the quotidian, like Pyrrho, and never-
theless plunged [plonge´] in the cosmos; devoted to the service of men,
and nevertheless perfectly free in his interior life; fully conscious and
yet at peace; forgetting nothing of what is unique and essential . . . It is
this ideal that the philosopher must try to realise. (2010b: 254)
This remarkable passage leads us directly to the third function that Hadot
assigns to the imagination in his reconception of ancient philosophy. This con-
cerns the question of how it is that such an unlikely, god-like sage would see
the world. The sage’s perspective has several features in the ancient literature
to which Hadot returns in different works. By vigilance and attention a` soi, the
sage attains to the most complete possible inner liberty or self-sufficiency
[autarcheia] from the impulsive pull and push of bodily pleasure and desire.
He overcomes equally the hankering for recognition or fame that otherwise
characterises human subjectivity and politics, achieving ‘a liberty in judgment
and independence with regard to his passions and desires’ (Hadot 2010b: 248).
What he experiences in the place of such erotic and conventional attachments
is a state of joyous freedom from haste and anxiety, and a constantly renewed
awareness of ‘the irreplaceable’ character of ‘each instant, [and with it] the
marvellous presence of the world’ (2010c: 315).10 This is the Epicurean ataraxia
compare V.1195–1202) As John Nichols notes, Lucretius indeed comes close in Book V
to arguing that every document of civilization has been a document in barbarism
(1976: 168–170).
10‘Spatially’, the sage views each event in life sub specie eternitatis, in what Hadot
calls ‘physics as a spiritual exercise’: learning to see the events of his own life, imagi-
natively, from outside or as if ‘from above’, in a way that relativises one’s ordinary pas-
sions and commitments. ‘Temporally’, Hadot tells us, the sophos as envisaged in the
ancient schools would view each moment simultaneously as if what he were seeing,
he was seeing for the first time (tam quam spectator novus, as per Seneca Letters 64);
and at the same time, as if he was fully aware that these were the last things he
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or the Stoic chara, what Hadot specifies as not simply a care of the self – Fou-
cault’s formulation – but also an elevation (de´passement) of that self to what he
terms une dimension cosmique (2010d: 345). Hadot writes:
this ideal sage will be one who is capable, at each instant, of recognis-
ing the divine reason in each event of the universe and of life, who
will be capable of perceiving the necessary rational order which
governs the interconnections of events, and who will be capable at
each instant of consenting totally to this order, more precisely
again, of desiring intensely each event, each effect produced by the
governing reason. (2010b: 245)
Our point here is that modern readers might immediately recognise these
features of the sage as uncannily familiar: viz. freedom or autarcheia, a pleasur-
able alertness to the uniqueness or singularity of the objects or experience,
overarched by an awareness of the interconnection of all particular events as
belonging in and manifesting a larger order. For they inescapably reflect and
anticipate the predicates post-Kantian philosophical aesthetics attaches to
the definitively imaginative experience of art, beauty and the sublime. Hadot,
far from denying this idea as anachronistic, dedicates the best part of ‘The
Sage and the World’ and ‘L’Homme Antique et La Nature’ to this theme.
Under his pen, we are invited to consider that the place in which ancient phil-
osophy raised the kinds of experiences modern philosophy seeks in the aes-
thetic – for there was no ancient ‘aesthetics’, or ‘philosophy of art’ – was in
the schools’ imaginative depictions of the consciousness of the sage. Via reflec-
tions on Merleau-Ponty’s, Cezanne’s, Kant’s and Callois’ aesthetics, Paul
Klee’s reflections on his art and Rilke’s poetry, Hadot indeed proposes that
aesthetic discourse is ‘what might permit modern man to imagine la conscience
cosmique’ (2010d: 350) and through it, ‘a reinsertion of the I into the world and
into the universal’ (346) which, in ancient philosophy, was theorised in the phi-
losophical literature on the sage. Hadot, for instance, often cites the Stoic
Seneca’s description of the imaginary prospect of such wisdom or ‘philosophy
herself’ as an aesthetic spectacle that ‘should delight all mortals with admira-
tion,’ like great works of art (Seneca: Letter 89, 1). ‘I am no less ecstatic in the
contemplation of wisdom than I am at other moments in the contemplation of
the world’, Seneca writes in Letter 64, ‘[so] that many times, I regard as if I was
a spectator seeing it for the first time’ (Seneca: Letter 64, 6). Perhaps the defini-
tive expression of this ancient, aesthetic sense associated with the highest cul-
tivation of philosophical consciousness however comes in another passage to
which Hadot returns, and which directly evokes Kant’s reflections on the
dynamic sublime. We mean Lucretius’ famous celebration of the elevated
would see; fully attentive to the present moment, without anxiety or fear for the future
(which is not yet) or about the past (which cannot be changed). Hence, Hadot com-
ments, the sage experiences a constantly renewed awareness of ‘the irreplaceable’
character of ‘each instant, [and with it] the marvellous presence of the world’
(Hadot 2010c: 315; 2010d: 354–351; 356–358; Lucretius 2010: II, 1023 ff.).
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perspective Epicurus’ natural philosophy opens to its initiates, in the Proema
to Book III of De Rerum Natura:
For once that philosophy which arose in your godlike mind has begun
to speak about the nature of things, then terrors in the mind disperse,
the world’s walls fall open, I see what is going on in all the void, the
majesty and calm habitations of the gods reveal themselves in places
where no winds disturb, no clouds bring showers, no white snow
falls, congealed with bitter frost, to harm them, the always cloudless
aether vaults above, and they smile, as far and wide the light spreads
out . . . and earth presents no barrier to a full view of all events going
on throughout the void lying underfoot. Godlike pleasure and awe
[horror] take hold of me up there with these things, to think that
nature, through your genius, is laid out so clearly, so openly
exposed on every side. (Lucretius 2010: III, 12–31)
We cannot here critically assess the distances and proximity of Luiz Costa
Lima’s conception of imaginative mimesis and the roles of the philosophical
imaginary in Pierre Hadot’s work. We have hoped only to have preliminarily
marked out the grounds for such an assessment. Costa Lima’s scepticism
about classical humanism is surely a telling consideration, as it seems to
speak very much against Hadot’s kind of position, including Hadot’s more
or less open appeal for a contemporary return to a revitalised sense of philos-
ophy as a way of life (Hadot 2010d: 346):
this view holds that subjectivity, if not everything we subsume as
‘human’, has existed ever since Logos came to be taken as both the
instrument and the proof of reason. Thus subjectivity was a ‘Greek
discovery’, part of the ‘Greek miracle’, and once achieved it was
henceforth forever to be present in human – that is, Western –
history . . . Greece is supposed to have reached the very heart of
the human – a heart so stable that from classical antiquity to the
present day it has never beaten with a different pulse. Thus all
that we – the elect descendants of Greece – need do is follow the
constant course of the themes first raised by the Greeks. (Costa
Lima 1992: 2–3)
What we have aimed at here is a kind of critical complement to Costa
Lima’s claims concerning the nature, history, and control of the imagination
in Western culture. Accepting the wide scope of his critical claim about the
socio-political control of imaginative literature in Western history, we have
suggested critically that Hadot’s work cautions us lest we position philosophy
in this history as always and necessarily an agency of control. In some histori-
cal forms, we have argued, it has rather stood as an ally in practicing and pro-
moting forms of criticity, and the playful, creative, and transformative
envisaging of alternative ways of experiencing the world Costa Lima theoreti-
cally celebrates in literary fiction. Any critique of ‘philosophy’ as always
opposed to the critical imagination can only stand, we have argued, relative
to philosophy as conceived on what Hadot suggests is but one, albeit the
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now hegemonic model, namely, as a body of systematic rational discourses,
including discourses about the literary, poetics, and imaginary. What this
vision of philosophy misses, Hadot shows, is how the ancient conception of
philosophy as a way of life promoted distinctly literary, aesthetic, and imagi-
native practices: first, by assisting the internalisation of the schools’ ideas; sec-
ondly, by envisaging in the sage and utopias edifying counterfactuals to help
students critically reimagine accepted norms; and thirdly, by arriving at a con-
ception of a transformed way of living and perceiving ‘according to nature’, a
conception whose parameters of autonomy and pleasurable contemplation of
the singularity of the objects of experience anticipate the experiences deli-
neated in modern aesthetic theory.
It is surely important to recall with Costa Lima that the imagination, even
in ancient philosophy, was also very frequently associated with the passions,
erroneous fears and quotidian modes of existence the pursuit of sophia aimed
to surpass (see Hadot 2006: 58–66). The imagination’s philosophical cultiva-
tion was never an end in itself in the ancient schools. It remained subordinate
to philosophy’s larger pedagogical and existential concerns. Yet Hadot’s work
has the undoubted merit of recovering for us this ancient philosophical culti-
vation of the imagination, as well as its critical mimetic functions. It suggests
that the philosophical imaginary’s subsequent near-disappearance from the
medieval and modern cultural radar, even in the work of a figure as erudite
as Costa Lima, might deserve its own chapter in Costa Lima’s story of the
Western control of the imagination.
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